Word: saigon
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...fifth and last meeting in Saigon, only Kissinger, U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Thieu and Nha were present. At last Thieu rendered judgment, and it was devastating. He violently denounced the nine-point plan. He insisted on a total withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces and the establishment of the DMZ as a political frontier. He scorned the proposed interim political body, the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord, as a coalition government in disguise...
Nixon, who was already beginning to worry that the Communists might be planning an offensive timed to begin just before the ceasefire, sent a second message to Hanoi. It said that the Oct. 31 signing was not possible because of difficulties in Saigon and asked for a new round of talks. The Hanoi trip was off; Kissinger, startled by the depth of Saigon's apprehensions, left for Washington in a somber mood, conceding to Thieu: "We go along with...
...called Nixon immediately. The next morning, the two met to discuss the U.S. response, and agreed that Kissinger would go on TV to give the Administration's version. The important thing, they agreed, was to maintain the momentum of peace. Kissinger was thus to address himself primarily to Saigon and Hanoi. With that in mind, he hardly considered the elation his words would cause in the U.S., and was surprised by it, he later admitted. Nixon specifically approved Kissinger's language in the assertion that "we believe that peace is at hand." And Kissinger genuinely believed...
...time the talks went well enough for his deputy, General Alexander Haig, to return to Washington to prepare to take a completed agreement to Saigon. But then Kissinger raised the DMZ issue for the second time, and Le Duc Tho exploded. Obviously reflecting Politburo decisions, the North Vietnamese angrily retracted concessions made in earlier sessions and flung down new demands...
...true that the very vagueness of the original draft-not to mention its reaffirmation of Hanoi's "one Viet Nam" position -was highly advantageous to the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. It is arguable that they won those advantages on the battlefield. But the effect of the Saigon-inspired delay since mid-October has been to weaken, perhaps mortally, the original compromise. Both delegations have been sweating to tie the military and political issues back together in ways that would benefit their own sides. It may be very difficult for anyone to pull the issues apart again...