Word: shahs
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...beginning to flow at a near normal rate from Iranian wells and Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi seemed to be holding fast, Washington policymakers and analysts were heatedly examining why the Carter Administration had been caught by surprise when violent riots swept Iran. TIME Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott reports...
Meanwhile, the Shah continued his efforts to form a coalition government that would take I over from the military once calm was restored. There " were hints of a compromise that would enable the Shah eventually to relinquish many of his powers, but the government was not yet prepared to publicize the plan...
...Washington seemed to be playing a thoroughly unedifying game of "Who lost Iran?" For a while last week Foggy Bottom was a morass of recriminations and alibis. Almost everybody agreed that the U.S. should have anticipated the Shah's troubles much sooner-but that somebody else was responsible for the failure to do so. Some State Department officials complained that in Tehran, U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan had suppressed pessimistic, and prophetic, cables from underlings. Others blamed Presidential National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, whose theory it is that the U.S. must bolster "regional influentials" like Iran. That theory, said...
Human rights advocates in the Administration blamed "militarists" and "cold warriors" for turning a blind eye to the Shah's repressive policies. The corridors of the Pentagon reverberated with bitter denunciations of the "softheaded liberals" who had blinded President Carter to what self-avowed hardheads call "the realities of power." But most of the grumbling was aimed at the CIA. White House staffers and congressional aides accused the agency of cranking out sanguine "estimates" of the situation in Iran. Administration sources revealed that Carter had circulated a handwritten memo to his top foreign policy advisers complaining about the poor...
...consensus of those meetings was more constructive than the assignment of blame to any one agency or even to any one Administration: ever since the 1960s, when Britain was withdrawing from east of the Suez and the Shah proclaimed himself the guardian of the Persian Gulf, the U.S.Iranian connection has been a textbook case of what diplomats call "clientitis"-the fallacy of mistaking an ally's interests for one's own. The U.S. failed to see that the Shah was weak simply because it had long been a principle of policy, and therefore an article of faith, that...