Word: saigon
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...Instead of Nixon's stipulations-a cease-fire throughout Indochina and new South Vietnamese elections-Muskie said that the U.S. should simply set a firm pull-out date in return for the safety of withdrawing forces and the release of American prisoners of war, leaving Saigon to work out its own accommodation with the Communists or else forgo further...
President Nixon's disclosure on January 25 of secret negotiations and his publication of a version of the October 11 U.S. peace plan have not improved the chances for a negotiated peace in Vietnam. Neither the Saigon government nor the North Vietnamese and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) take Nixon's offer seriously, Nixon has used Hanoi's unwillingness to send a high-ranking delegate to Paris for discussions on the October 11 plan with Dr. Kissinger as an excuse to step...
...command in Saigon is forever fending off ARVN demands for more complex gear. One U.S. general tells of having to lecture some Vietnamese generals at a recent Saigon dinner. "I told them that in 1968, General Vo Nguyen Giap [the Communist Defense Minister] had a regiment right here in Saigon. He had no helicopters, no F-4s, no MIGs, no B-52s. 'Now,' I said, 'he's Vietnamese too. So how do you suppose General Giap solved his logistics problems?' They said they really didn't know, so I told them that the most...
...experts give Saigon's 587,000 regular troops a fair shot at dealing effectively with North Vietnamese main-force units-if they have ample air support. But no one knows what to expect from the untried irregulars who man the vital outposts along the roads and outside the villages. These Regional and Popular Forces boast 513,000 wellarmed, full-time troops, but they are unseasoned and would be no match for the tough Viet Cong or North Vietnamese professionals. As for the unpaid part-timers of the 500,000-man Popular Self-Defense Force, they are assumed...
...Cong infrastructure, for instance, might not be nearly so weak as is generally assumed. A sudden withdrawal or reduction of U.S. airpower would increase doubts about ARVN's abilities, even if the flow of American supplies and economic support continued. But for the moment, U.S. military men in Saigon and Washington remain reasonably sure that the newly Vietnamized war machine can accomplish its mission: to give the Saigon regime a "reasonable chance" of survival when American troops go home...