Word: backup
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Meanwhile NASA's paper work continued to track the problem. On Dec. 17, 1982, the joint was moved to the agency's "criticality 1" list, meaning that it lacked a reliable backup part and that if the joint failed it would lead to "loss of mission and crew." While that presumably should have alerted NASA's flight officials to the urgency of the matter, there was a complication: fully 748 parts of the shuttle carried the same criticality-1 designation, including 114 on the booster motors. None was given any priority in urgency, so none stood out as demanding...
...each time she drove an extra-base hit to left or snagged a fly ball in right field--her backup position on hurling off-days--the Hamburg, N.Y. native proved that her talents extended far beyond pitching...
...though we didn't intend to eliminate the safety problems. Immediately after the TMI disaster, a task force of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) developed a 600-page "TMI Action Plan," which outlined the major weaknesses in nuclear power plants in the U.S.--unreliable equipment, faculty backup cooling systems, insufficient operator training, poorly designed control rooms, inadequate data displays, etc. And to the NRC's credit, much progress has been made--in operator training, control rooms, pipe repairs...
...joints on the rocket boosters, one of which obviously failed on the Jan. 28 Challenger flight. Re-evaluations and, if necessary, redesigns would be ordered for all 748 shuttle parts designated "criticality 1," meaning that if they failed the mission would be lost, since these parts had no backup performing the same vital function. When any qualified person "raises his hand" to oppose a launch-go, Truly pledged, "he will be listened to." Truly insisted that his "conservative" flight philosophy would not mean "a namby-pamby program." Said he: "The business of flying in space is bold business. We cannot...
...appalled" by the reasoning behind the no-fly stance of Thiokol, $ while Mulloy insisted that there was no demonstrable link between temperature and O-ring erosion. He contended that despite NASA's placing the booster seals on the criticality-1 list because of a lack of redundancy, the backup ring would certainly seat in the critical early-ignition phase of the launch and provide a seal even if gases got by the first ring. Since NASA had not established a minimum launch temperature for the boosters, he and Hardy both complained that Thiokol was trying to change the flight criteria...